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Religion as a Factor Influencing Turkish Women’s Decisions to Work 
 
By Mary Lou O’Neil
1






 This article uses survey data collected from more than 500 women in Istanbul to examine 
whether or not religion exerts an influence on women’s decisions to work or not. Our work 
revealed that religion does not appear to have a direct impact on whether or not Turkish women 
choose to work. Rather the expectation that women fulfill their traditional roles as caregivers 
proves a greater obstacle for women who wish to enter the labor market. Religion, in the case of 
Turkey, Islam, can only be seen as an influence on Turkish women’s work decisions to the extent 
that it supports “patriarchal mentalities” which define women first and foremost as mothers and 
caregivers. 
 




 Turkey has the lowest female labor force participation rates in OECD countries with just 
26.6 percent for women aged 15-64 in 2007. This rate is even lower for urban women. Moreover, 
the female civilian employment rate of Turkey was 26.1 percent as a percentage of civilian 
employment in 2007 (OECD 2008). The low female labor force participation rates of Turkey 
compare rather unfavorably with some other OECD countries that have female participation rates 




Table 1.  Female Labor Force Participation Rates in OECD Countries 
 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 
Canada 68.4 67.8 70.4 73.1  73.5  74.3 
Mexico - 39.5 41 43.2  44.5  45.3 
United States 67.8 69.7 70.7 69.2  69.3  69.1 
Australia 61.8 64.2 65.4 68.4  68.9  69.4 
Japan 57.1 58.4 59.6 60.8  61.3  61.9 
Korea 49.9 51.4 52 54.5  54.8  54.8 
New Zealand 63.2 65.9 67.5 70.8  71.4  71.8 
Austria - 61.6 61.8 65.6  67 67.8 
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Belgium 46.1 51.7 56.6 59.5  58.9  60.2 
Czech Republic - 64.1 63.7 62.4  62.3  61.5 
Denmark 77.6 73.3 75.9 75.1  76.7  76.4 
Finland 73.4 69.5 72.1 72.9  73.2  73.9 
France 57.2 59.9 61.7 64.3  64.5  65 
Germany 55.5 61.1 63.3 66.9  68.5  69.4 
Greece 42.6 44.3 49.7 54.6  55 55.1 
Hungary - 50.3 52.6 55.1  55.5  55.1 
Iceland - 80.9 83.3 83.4  84.2  83.6 
Ireland 42.6 47.3 55.7 60.2  61.3 63 
Italy 44 42.3 46.3 50.4  50.8  50.7 
Luxembourg 42.4 44.1 51.7 57 58.2  55.4 
Netherlands 53.1 59.1 65.2 68.6  69.4  71.1 
Norway 70.7 72.1 76.5 75.4  75.6  76.5 
Poland - 61 59.9 58.3  56.8  56.5 
Portugal 59.6 59.9 63.8 67.9  68.4  68.8 
Slovak Republic - 61.4 63.2 61.5  60.9  60.7 
Spain 42.2 47.1 52.9 59.1  61.1  62.3 
Sweden 82.5 77.3 76.4 77.7  77.7  78.2 
Switzerland - 68.3 71.7 74.3  74.7  75 
Turkey 36 32.7 28 26.5  26.7  26.6 
United Kingdom 67.3 67.1 68.9 69.6  70.3  69.8 
* 
Women aged between 15-64 years. 
Source: OECD, Labour Force Statistics 1987-2007, 2008. 
 
 
 Despite rising education rates, the number of women working for pay in Turkey has 
continued to decline in recent decades plunging from 72 percent in 1955 to the current rate which 
hovers in the low twenties (Aysıt Tansel 2002). Furthermore, female labor force participation 
rates have been declining over the past decades. It was 36 percent in 1990 and declined to 26.6 
percent in 2007. However, the female labor force participation rates have increased in most 
OECD countries (and also in most developed countries) in this same period, except in Sweden, 
Denmark, and three former-Communist countries (Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovak 
Republic). Despite the small decrease observed in female labor force participation rates in 
Sweden and Denmark, the current rates in these countries still remain high. 
 The question remains what has caused such a precipitous decline and what is it that 
continues to keep women in Turkey from entering the labor force. Our research focuses on 
whether or not religion, in this case Islam, is a factor influencing women’s choice to work or not. 
Based on survey data, the results indicate that religion appears to exert little or no influence on 
women’s decisions not to work, at the same time, overall, the women we surveyed 
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Religion and Economics 
 Since Weber (1905) asserted the importance of religion to social change and economic 
growth, there has been an interest in trying to determine the effects of religion on economics. 
Iannoccone (1998) writing early in the development of the subfield of religion and economics 
divided the literature in this area into three main categories:  the interpretation of religion from 
an economic perspective which applies economics in an attempt to explain religious behavior; 
research which explores the economic implications of religion, and finally the work of those who 
use various sacred texts and scripture to evaluate economic policies.  While many scholars are 
unwilling to draw a direct causal link between religion and economic achievement, there are a 
number of studies which trace links between religious attitudes and factors that contribute to a 
positive economic environment. On the large scale, Putnam traced the lack of development in 
southern Italy to a culture where trust between individuals is replaced by faith in the Catholic 
Church (1993).  Landes (1998) and Stulz and Williamson (2003) also attribute lagging 
developing and prosperity in Catholic countries to the Catholic Church’s culture of intolerance 
and tradition again money lending. At the level of the individual, Tomes (1983) followed by 
Meng and Sentence (1984) found that among Canadian men “religion appears to be an important 
dimension of family culture influencing earnings and the rate of return to human capital” with 
Jews fairing the best followed by Protestants and then Catholics (Tomes 1983: 136)
.
 Chiswick 
has also confirmed the affect of religion on wages (1983). Others have found links between 
religion and economic important behavior relating to school attendance (Richard Freeman 1986), 
criminal activity (David Evans, Francis Cullen, Gregory Dunaway, Velmer Burton 1995) and 
health (Christopher Ellison 1991).
 
 Despite the growing literature on the ways that religion 
intersects with economics, there is a decided absence of much work on the affect of religion on 
women’s economic behavior. With the exception of Amin and Alam’s work which examines the 
effect of religion on women’s paid employment decisions in Malaysia, there are no known 
studies of women’s labor activities in developing and or Middle Eastern countries, and Turkey is 
no exception (2008). 
 More recently there seems to be a resurgence of interest in mapping the intersection of 
religion and economics particularly large cross cultural studies. Inglehart and Baker using data 
from the World Values Survey (WVS) which covers 66 countries, assert that “a history of 
Protestant or Orthodox or Islamic or Confucian traditions gives rise to cultural zones with 
distinctive value systems that persist after controlling for the effects of economic development 
(2000: 49)”. Cultural values of which religion are a constitutive aspect continue to effect 
economic development. Guiso et al. (2003) also working with WVS data examined the 
relationship between religion and a variety of economic attitudes including views toward 
government, cooperation, working women and laws.
  
Generally they found that religious beliefs 
are connected to positive economic attitudes where positive is defined in terms of higher income 
and growth and Christian religions tend to buttress attitudes that are supportive economic 
growth. Of specific relation to our work, they also identified that “all religious are associated 
with a more conservative attitude toward women. However, that effect is twice as strong for 
Muslims than for any other religion” (Guiso 2003:264).
 
 Feldmann (2007) in his examination of 
the effect of Protestantism on labor outcomes lends some support to this idea. His work found 
that in countries where Protestantism is the dominant religion labor force participation overall 
was higher and among women was difference was even more pronounced (Feldman 2007).
 
 
Feldmann attributes these differences in part to religions impact on culture: “countries dominated 
by other religions (e.g., Catholicism, Islam, Buddhism) are likely to have developed a national 
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culture that does not put a high value on hard and diligent work and may be hostile toward paid 
employment of women( Feldman 2007: 808)”. 
 Given the findings in this literature, one would expect Islam in particular, to exert a 
decidedly negative influence on women’s economic choices. In fact, Amin and Alam’s (2008) 
study of women in Malaysia provides a much more nuanced portrait of the effect of religion. 
Their study demonstrates that while religion does have an influence it varies rather widely for 
rural and urban women. The effect of religion is felt most heavily by single rural women in 
Malaysia. While single women earned less than their married counterparts overall, it is rural 
Buddhist single women who earn the least and married Muslim women who earn the most 
(Amin and Alam 2008).
 
 Undoubtedly, religion plays an important role in women’s labor markets 
choices, but the role is not uniformly negative or positive for all women of a particular group. 
Rather religion and its role in economics is deeply cultural contingent. Part of the difficulty with 
large cross cultural surveys, such as those by Inglehart and Barker, Guiso et al. and Feldmann, is 
that they do not adequately distinguish between countries and their practice of a given religion. 
There is great diversity within the religions and their application in a given cultural context. 
 
 
Turkey and Female Labor Force Participation 
 Turkey has the lowest female labor force participation rates of OECD member countries 
and the numbers of women engaged in the paid labor force has decreased dramatically over the 
past few decades. Rising urbanization and the decline in agricultural work have left the vast 
majority of women in Turkey outside the labor market. Beside the low female labor force 
participation rates, the rates of paid employment for women are also low. Just 53 percent of total 
female employment in 2008 was in paid labor activities. Moreover, in 2008, 34 percent of all 
women employed were as unpaid family workers (Turkish Statistical Institute 2008).
 
 Those 
women who do find work are largely still confined to the agricultural sector while their urban 
sisters are relegated to low paid, low-skill employment (Cem Başlevent,and Özlem Onaran 
2004). Unemployment is also far higher among urban women than it is for their male 
counterparts (Başlevent and Onaran).
 
 In discussions of women and work in Turkey it is also of 
vital importance to examine the informal economy. A focus that is strictly trained on income 
producing work outside the home may mask the actual numbers of women who work for pay 
(Mine Cınar 1994; İpek İlkkaracan 2000; Jenny White 2004).
 
 Some estimate the rate of informal 
employment outside of agriculture to be as high as 41 percent (Hacer Ansal and others 2000).
 
 
Further masking the numbers of actual working women is the fact that many who do piecework 
at home or in small family run shops often do not view themselves as working (White 2004).
 
 
Instead, they see their income producing activities in the context of the reigning gender ideology 
which often defines women by their roles as wives and mothers (İlkkaracan 2000; White 2004). 
 There have been numerous explanations offered for the lack of women participating in 
the labor force in Turkey. Perhaps more than anything the transition from an economy dominated 
by agricultural to one dominated by markets has eliminated many jobs that women once 
performed (Tansel 2002). Moreover, low rates of education for women in Turkey further hinder 
their search for jobs (Meltem İnce and M. Hulusi Demir 2006).
 
 In her exploration of married 
women’s decisions to work, Kızılırmak (2008) found that women enter paid employment 
primarily to compensate for their husband’s unemployment.
 
 At the same time, she observed that 
fertility decreases married women’s likelihood to work when children are young. Additionally, 
Acar (2008) points to the lack of child care as an obstacle for women returning to work while 
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İlkkaracan (2000) and Moghadam (1997) emphasize the unequal division of labor in the home as 
preventing women from entering the labor market. 
 Moreover, Kardam and Toksöz (2004) assert that women are prevented from entering the 
labor force by prevailing cultural attitudes which continue to define women in terms of their 
domestic role. When women are able to enter the labor force they face gender based 
discrimination in the workplace (Kardam and Toksöz 2004).  Female labor force participation 
rates are relatively low in Middle Eastern countries when compared to European Union (EU) and 
OECD countries and Bilgin and Kilicarslan (2008) attribute this to both cultural and religious 
factors. 
 Despite this extensive literature on female labor force participation, we are aware of no 
study on Turkey which directly examines religion as a factor in this aspect of women’s lives. 
Goksel, however, in an interesting study, attempts to measure the impact of conservatism on 
female labor force participation (2009).  Asserting the women are not alone in their decisions to 
work or not she used data from the Turkish Household Budget and the Turkish Household Labor 
Force Surveys to examine the impact of tradition and social norms on mothers’ work decisions. 
In line with the existing literature she observed that the shift away from a rural agricultural based 
economy, paired with low education rates and a lack of childcare negatively impacted women’s 
ability to locate paid work (Göksel 2009).
 
 She attributes these disadvantages to conservative 
social attitudes that subscribe to traditional gender roles (Göksel 2009).
 
 Despite her attempt to 
examine conservatism and its effect on women’s decisions to work, nowhere does she address 
the issue of religion. Religion continues to be an unexplored piece of the puzzle in issues related 
to women and work. 
 
 
Turkey, Religion and Secularism 
 Since its earliest days, the Republic of Turkey, founded in 1923, has been a secular state. 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkey abolished the caliphate in 1924 and then 
proceeded to oversee the replacement of an Islamic system of laws with a secular legal system 
modeled after legal codes in Europe at that time. To this day, the population of Turkey is 
overwhelmingly Muslim, but there is no state religion and the state is strictly secular. Despite the 
state’s commitment to secularism, the last several decades in Turkey have witnessed a resurgence 
in Islam. Since 2002, the government has been dominated by the Justice and Development Party 
(AKP) which has its roots in Islam. The success of AKP is unprecedented in a country which has 
seen numerous religious minded political parties closed by the courts for violations of the 
principle of secularism. In 2008, AKP itself barely survived an attempt to ban the party from 
politics. Alongside the political victories of AKP, perhaps the most visible sign of the resurgence 
of Islam is the increased presence of women wearing the headscarf and making demands for the 
lifting of ban on headscarves in public spaces. 
 Secularism in Turkey does not merely attempt to separate religion from the state but 
seeks to control virtually all religious activities. This includes bans on the Islamic headscarf and 
other religious clothing in public spaces such as schools, courts, and government offices. 
Moreover, there is an attempt to rid the public sphere of all signs of religion. Nilüfer Göle goes 
so far as to argue that “the public sphere (in Turkey) is institutionalized and imagined as a site for 
the implementation of a secular and progressive way of life (2002: 176)”. This renders the public 
sphere a site of enormous contestation over the role of religion in Turkish life. The workplace is 
also a potential site for this struggle as more women in Turkey, both religiously observant and 
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not, covered and not, seek to enter the public space of the workforce. Specifically, our study 
seeks to examine whether religion impacts women’s decisions not to work. 
 While there is diversity in the practice of Islam in Turkey, the vast majority of Turks are 
adherents of Sunni Islam. Within this tradition, albeit not exclusive to it, are five requirements: 
the recognition of Allah as the one true god; prayer five times a day; keeping the fast during the 
month of Ramadan; the giving of alms; and the performance of the Hajj. Some of the 
practicalities of these requirements such as prayer five times a day and keeping the fast may 
make work more difficult particularly if the workplace is not sympathetic or unwilling to 
accommodate a worker’s religious practice. Although the wearing of the headscarf is not 
considered one of the basic tenets of Islam, some women feel it is their religious duty. Given the 
restriction on the headscarf in many public spaces, this clearly may present a difficulty for 
women who cover and wish to work. For those women who cannot find a workplace that is 
tolerant of their religious practice, the decision not to work may represent an unwillingness to 




 This study is based on a survey conducted of 518 non-working women. The survey was 
conducted during the summer months of 2009. Although many of the women that we surveyed 
had worked at one time, at the time we contacted them they were not employed. In attempt to 
gather as diverse a sample as possible the surveys were administered in 10 different districts of 
Istanbul (Bağcılar, Bakırköy, Başakşehir, Beşiktaş, Kadıköy, Pendik, Sultanbeyli, Sişli, 
Ümraniye, and Zeytinburnu). It is believed that each district has different income and welfare 
levels.  The districts chosen are divided between the European and the Asian side of the city and 
these neighborhoods are home to various different groups of people. 
 In our attempt to ascertain whether or not religion prevents women from working, we 
specifically chose women who were not engaged in paid work at the time of our data collection. 
However, women who work as unpaid family workers were excluded. We also excluded from the 
sample women who were retired or physically unable to work. As Islam is by far the most 
prevalent religion in Turkey, our survey focuses exclusively on Muslim women. The women in 
the sample range in age from 18-55. The majority of the women were married and more than 
three quarters of them had children. 
 The surveys were administered in two different ways: by telephone and in person. Two 
hundred eleven women were given the survey by telephone while the remaining 307 were 
interviewed face to face. The data collected was then evaluated on the basis of frequency and 
cross-tabulation and the statistical significance of the cross-tabulations was measured using the 
Chi-square test. While the sample is not representative it is diverse although, the results are 
admittedly limited by the fact that the survey was only administered in Istanbul. Without doubt 
further work needs to be done not only outside Istanbul but outside the major metropolitan areas. 
However, the diversity of the survey still provides some insight in the interplay of religion and 
work in women’s lives. Moreover, we view this research not as a final stopping point but as an 
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Results 
 Due to the somewhat sensitive nature of the subject of religion in Turkey, our survey 
asked women a wide ranging set of questions about their general attitudes toward work as well as 
their attitudes toward Islam and their practice of it. We employed this strategy in part assuage 
peoples fears or difficulties in discussing religion and also to tease out what effect, if any, 
religion, being one of many cultural factors at play, may have on women and their attempts to 
work. Applying relatively simple statistical methods, we attempted to trace the effects of religion 
on women’s decisions not to work while also considering the importance of education and 
marriage, two factors widely accepted as impacting women’s choices particularly in the area of 
work. We found that when deciding whether to work or not religion had little or no effect on 
their decision making. 
 In our sample, women were relatively even divided between those who had worked at 
one time and those who had never worked. Forty-five percent had worked while fifty-five 
percent had not which once again points to Turkey’s low numbers regarding the number of 
women in the labor force. Interestingly, despite the fact that nearly 85 percent of the women we 
interviewed were married, it was single women who accounted for 36 percent of those who had 
at one time worked. Marriage appears to have some effect on women and their work decisions. 
At the same time, there was overwhelming support for women to work. Ninety-five percent of 
the respondents though women thought it was necessary for women to work. When explicitly 
asked if married women with children should work, 86 percent stated yes. This coincides with 
other survey work which demonstrates large support among women for women to work (Mary 
Lou O’Neil and Fazıl Güler 2009).
 
 And yet, among the women we interviewed nearly half said 
that even if there was paid work they would not do it. However, this picture changes 
considerably when the women were asked if they had to work would they to which 85 percent 
replied yes. Somewhat surprisingly, nearly 15 percent of the respondents would still rather not 
work even if they were in a situation which forced them to do so.  
 Despite large support for women working in Turkey, our sample indicates there may be 
pockets of women who also resist work for pay. This resistance may exist for a number of 
reasons. As discussed earlier, the work of White (2004) and İlkkaracan (2000) attests to the 
enduring power of traditional gender roles and the need for many women to view themselves 
within that context.  This may prevent some women from working at all while others who do 
indeed work do not view their labor as such. 
 Among the women that were interviewed for this research roughly 77 percent identified 
themselves as religious or very religious while the same numbers reported that they perform their 
religious duties at least some of the time if not very often. In contrast to this, as can be seen in 
Table 2 only slightly more than 1 percent claimed that religion or moral factors had any impact 
on their decision not to work. This speaks rather clearly to how little religion in Turkey appears 
to influence women’s lack of participation in the labor force. At the very least, the women we 
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Table 2. I don’t want to work for religious or moral reasons 
 






 No influence at all 412 79,5 79,5 79,5 
 Not much influence 28 5,4 5,4 84,9 
 Neutral 13 2,5 2,5 87,5 
 Some influence 33 6,4 6,4 93,8 
 Large influence 31 6,0 6,0 99,8 
 99 FY-CY 1 ,2 ,2 100,0 
 Total 518 100,0 100,0 100,0 
 
 
 However, 37 percent of respondents did relate that either their husband or families would 
not want them to work. This includes women who once worked which means that the experience 
of having entered the paid labor market does not reduce family resistance for all. In addition to 
family resistance, 35 percent of the women reported that the largest influence on their decision 
not to work derived from the need for them to care for someone at home. It appears that the 
expectation that women fulfill their traditional role as caretaker takes precedence over religion as 
a driving factor for women in this study not to work as can be seen in Table 3. 
 
 
Table 3. Responsibility for childcare or care of another 
 






 No influence at all 201 38,8 38,8 38,8 
 Not much influence 36 6,9 6,9 45,8 
 Neutral 20 3,9 3,9 49,6 
 Some influence 80 15,4 15,4 65,1 
 Large influence 179 34,6 34,6 99,6 
 99 FY-CY 2 ,4 ,4 100,0 
 Total 518 100,0 100,0 100,0 
 
 
 Lending further support to the lack of religion’s overt influence is the fact that 31 percent 
of the women in this sample who identified themselves as religious or very religious worked at 
one time while roughly the same number of women who actively practice their religion have 
worked as well. Although these women are outnumbered by those who have never worked this 
still represents a significant number. This gives some indication that women can practice Islam 
and still participate in the labor force. Furthermore, 65 percent of this same group (religious or 
very religious) claimed they would work if it was necessary and the same for those who perform 
their religious rites with some regularity. The fact that those women who identify themselves as 
religious as well as those who regularly practice their religion have both worked and would work 
if necessary casts further doubt about the directly negative influence of Islam on women and 
labor force participation in Turkey. The vast majority of women that we surveyed do not appear 
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 Although Turkey has a deplorably low rate of women engaged in the labor force, our 
research does not indicate that religion, in this case Islam, is an outright obstacle blocking 
women’s entry into the labor market. Despite this there still exists an effective ban on the 
headscarf in schools, government offices and other public spaces. Only recently has the ban been 
lifted in universities.  The public sector is one of the largest providers of reliable employment in 
Turkey. The ban, of course, has the effect of preventing many women who cover their heads 
from working. Either they cannot achieve the levels of education necessary for employment or 
they are outright refused due to the fact that they cover their head. The impact of the headscarf 
ban on the economic future of women who cover is another area that requires further 
investigation. 
 While we did not find religion as a major obstacle for the women we surveyed, it appears 
that the existence of a continued gendered division of labor at home which dictates women as the 
primary caretakers operates to prevent many women from entering the labor market.  This 
parallels findings in Chile of a “negative correlation between cultural values upholding 
traditional gender roles and a woman’s decision to participation in the labor market Dante 
Contreres and Gonzolo Plazo 2010: 39)”.  Despite the lack of evidence of a direct link between 
religion and women not working in urban Turkey, the low labor force participation rates of 
women can be explained at least in part by what Kardam and Toksöz term “existing patriarchal 
mentalities which are unfavorable to women’s work (2004: 6)”.
 
 Many women have dropped out 
of the labor force due to limited job opportunities and family reasons. The fact is that women 
tend to stay at home rather than join the labor market. 
 Furthermore, the historic belief, in some ways supported by Islam, that women’s primary 
role is that of mother and caretaker certainly exerts a heavy influence. As Inglehart and Baker 
assert “The broad cultural heritage of a society-Protestant, Roman Catholic, Orthodox, 
Confucian, or Communist-leaves an imprint on values that endures despite modernization (2000: 
19)”.
 
 In the case of Turkey, the legacy of Islam endures regardless of the religiosity of the 
inhabitants as the religious traditions shape “the national culture of a given societies but...today 
their impact is transmitted mainly through nationwide institutions, to the population of that 
society as a whole-even to those who have little or no contact with religious institutions 
(Inglehart and Baker 2000: 36).  Despite Turkey’s secularism today, the tradition of women has 
the primary caretakers of home and hearth remains. Working women bear primary responsible 
for housework and for children (O’Neil and Güler 2009).
 
 Many of the women in this survey 
reported their duties at home prevented them from entering paid employment while others 
reported that their families would not approve of their working. Although the direct effect of 
religion on women’s choices not to work seems negligible, the cultural effect of a belief system 
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